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Executive Summary
As the U.S. Congress has failed to pass meaningful climate legislation, the EPA has initiated a
series of regulations designed to recognize greenhouse gases as endangering human health and welfare,
and set greenhouse gas emission standards for vehicle fleets and for major stationary sources.
Unsurprisingly these efforts have been challenged in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. Challenges
to the Endangerment Finding (which focus on EPA’s reliance on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) and to the Tailpipe Rule (which claim that it is redundant, and that EPA improperly failed to
consider its effects on other regulations) rely on climate skepticism more than they do on legal doctrine.
The case against EPA’s Timing Rule, which justifies application of GHG regulations to stationary sources,
centers on real ambiguities in the Clean Air Act, though it may fairly claim judicial deference via Chevron
v. NRDC. This makes the “Tailoring” Rule claim, that it disregards explicit statutory regulation guidelines
(in order to accomplish the “broader intent” of the statute), the strongest challenge to EPA’s actions.
One striking fact about these suits is the pure number of claims: over 80 distinct claims were
filed by 35 different petitioners to these four rules. This has necessitated extensive simplification of the
litigation, including consolidation into three major cases (and a minor sub‐case). Petitioners have
sought further to have all three consolidated cases heard by the same panel, perhaps in an effort to link
all regulations together as one set of illegal activity. However, the three cases cover three different
Titles of the Clean Air Act, so coordination here may not improve judicial efficiency to the extent that
has justified coordination of cases in the past.
The petitioners have also moved to stay implementation of EPA’s rules, due to take effect on
January 2, 2011. The most relevant question here, apart from a preliminary determination of the merits
of the case, will be whether they would suffer “irreparable harm” if regulations were to move forward.
This argument will focus around the economic harm to national industries that could come with
increased costs, specifically whether it could lead to immediate loss of economic activity; and around
the possibility of avoiding a debilitating backlog of building permits once these requirements take hold.
The case against staying vehicle regulations looks strong; that against stationary source permit
requirements will depend significantly on economic analyses.
There is also some question of what remedy might be appropriate if the DC Circuit rules against
EPA in these cases. The two‐prong analysis used in such cases will consider the extent of EPA’s deviation
from the law and the detrimental effect of immediately overturning existing regulations. Treatment of
similar rules in the past suggests that a strong detrimental effect to an established existing permit
structure will make courts hesitant to step in with a heavy hand, instead remanding to agencies for
modification in line with their decision. Thus, the outcome of motions for stay may well affect the final
remedy even beyond its obvious predictive power of the ultimate ruling on the merits: it will determine
whether EPA will already have a working regulatory structure in place.
This litigation activity merits attention. In the absence of viable climate legislation for at least
two years, these decisions will have important bearing on the extent to which the United States is able
to address its greenhouse gas emissions going forward.
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I. Introduction
In the absence of climate legislation in the U.S. Congress, parties in the United States seeking meaningful
action on climate change mitigation have turned to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for
action. However, despite express Supreme Court authorization to consider regulating greenhouse gases
(GHGs) in Massachusetts v. EPA in 2007, EPA’s efforts to regulate GHGs have been heavily contested.
This report gives a preliminary summary of the state of litigation today, including a description of the
major cases and arguments that have been raised thus far. Its main focus, however, is to provide a
procedural background on the litigation process, including consolidation and coordination procedures,
motions for stay of judgment, and possible remedies.

II. Legal Overview
Four separate EPA rulemakings are under review: (1) the “Endangerment Finding,” which concludes that
carbon emission from moving vehicles are “reasonably likely” to threaten public health and welfare; (2)
the “Tailpipe Rule,” which, based on the Endangerment Finding, sets GHG emission standards for Light
Duty Vehicles; (3) the “Timing Rule,” or “Reconsideration Decision,” which builds off of the Tailpipe Rule,
interpreting the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s) language to authorize regulation of stationary sources; and (4)
1
the “Tailoring Rule,” which exempts small emitters from stationary source regulations.
As outlined below, three different groups have filed motions to stay EPA’s rulemaking power pending a
final decision in the DC Circuit. The briefs filed in support and opposition to these stay motions can
2

provide the first glimpse into the legal arguments both sides expect to pursue. An analysis of the legal
arguments on both sides suggests that petitioners’ claims against the Endangerment Finding and
Tailpipe Rule are the weaker challenges, and their Tailoring Rule claim is the strongest challenge.

1

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); Light‐Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That
Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010); Prevention
of Significant Deterioration and Title VI Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, Att. A (June 3, 2010).
2
Petitioners’ Motion for Partial Stay of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulations, D.C. Cir. (Sep. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/16/document_gw_02.pdf (hereinafter NAM Stay Motion); State of
Texas’s Motion for Stay of EPA’s Endangerment Finding, Timing Rule and Tailpipe Rule, D.C. Cir. (Sep. 15, 2010),
available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2010/091610motion_to_stay_ett.pdf (hereinafter
Texas Stay Motion 1); State of Texas’s Motion for a Stay of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, D.C. Cir. (Sep. 15,
2010), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2010/091610motion_to_stay_tailoring.pdf
(hereinafter Texas Stay Motion 2); Motion for Stay, D.C. Cir. Doc: 1266030 (Sep. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/16/document_gw_03.pdf (hereinafter CRR Stay Motion); EPA Response
to Motions to Stay, D.C. Cir. (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Files.View&FileStore_id=a896cdb9‐6166‐4202‐be03‐b9bfaf12bf30 (hereinafter EPA Response to Stay Motions);
State and Environmental Intervenors’ Joint Response to Motions to Stay, D.C. Cir. (Nov. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/11/02/document_gw_01.pdf (hereinafter States Response to Stay Motion).

2

For a full listing of legal arguments made against the four decisions, and which petitioner groups made
which challenge, see Appendix A. For a list of EPA’s and state and environmental intervenors’
arguments in response to the challenges, see Appendix B.

A. Endangerment Finding
The main case against the Endangerment Finding is that EPA illegally delegated its duties to unreliable
outside parties (specifically the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC), and that it was
impermissibly vague in its rulemakings. These arguments face an uphill climb: EPA has a long history of
relying on outside peer‐reviewed scientific reports, and its scientific conclusions are generally entitled to
3

strong judicial deference. Notably, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA allowed endangerment findings to be made at the
4
discretion of the Administrator, even without specific numerical determinations.
Another argument focuses on the unreliability of EPA’s sources and attacks the credibility of the IPCC, in
part based on the well‐publicized “Climate‐gate” controversy. This disbelief in anthropogenic climate
change reflects a minority view in the scientific and international community. Its success will depend on
the court’s reading of the evidence; although it is also worth noting that EPA is also entitled to Chevron
deference in certifying the authenticity of scientific conclusions. Petitioners also complain that IPCC
reports were not in EPA’s record and so were kept from the public; but as EPA points out, it would be
impractical to reprint IPCC reports that are already publicly available.
Finally, petitioners argue that the Endangerment Finding was incomplete because it did not determine
exactly what level of GHG emissions would quantify as endangerment; and it failed to consider policy
choices in its ruling. Both of these arguments misconstrue the structure of the CAA; the endangerment
finding requirement as established in §111 tasks the EPA with listing any pollutant which “causes, or
contributes significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.” 5 This language does not appear to explicitly require the policy considerations or
quantification of danger thresholds that petitioners have requested.

B. Tailpipe Rule
Petitioners’ primary argument against the Tailpipe Rule is that the rule fails to properly calculate its full
costs and benefits. Specifically, they argue that EPA should have considered this rule’s impact on
stationary source regulations because EPA had already determined that regulation of vehicle GHG
emissions would automatically trigger regulation of stationary‐source GHG emissions. However, this
assertion misstates EPA’s finding in its Timing Rule (below): while a stationary source may be regulated
no sooner than when the first “control requirement” takes place (in this case, the Tailpipe Rule), it only
allows for, and explicitly does not mandate, stationary source regulations once this control requirement

3

This principle is most famously codified in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,507.
5
42 U.S.C. §7411(b).
4

3

is in place.6 Respondents further argue that evaluating the effects of unknown potential future rules
would be infeasible, which may ultimately underlie any court decision here.7
Other arguments against the Tailpipe Rule include that its benefits are too trivial to justify action, and
that it is duplicative of already‐existing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards under the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). However, EPA responds by pointing out that
carbon emissions are not redundant to the emissions of various ozone‐causing gases (they impose a
different type of obligation, which allows more nimble regulatory options), and that there is no mandate
in the CAA that regulations meet any minimum effectiveness threshold so long as the benefits exceed
the costs.8 EPA’s points here largely mirror those made by the Supreme Court in Mass v. EPA.

C. Timing Rule
The Timing Rule Challenge focuses on an ambiguity in interpretations of Sections 161, 165, and 166 in
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Chapter of the CAA. §165 bans construction of a
facility “in any area to which [PSD] applies” unless, among other requirements, the facility meets Best
Available Control Technology (BACT) standards “for each pollutant subject to regulation” under the
CAA.9 Thus, there are two restricting variables: area and pollutant. For the first (area), §161 applies PSD
10
to areas that “satisfy” an EPA‐determined Natural Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS). Petitioners
argue that an area must satisfy a NAAQS for a particular pollutant to be subject to PSD requirements for
that same pollutant. They draw support from Alabama Power v. Costle, 11 which they say imposed this
requirement. EPA disagrees, arguing that satisfying NAAQS for any pollutant can subject an area to all
PSD requirements.12 It interprets Alabama Power as only precluding PSD requirements “outside of clean
air areas” (i.e. areas which have not satisfied their NAAQS, or non‐attainment areas); and that because
there are no non‐attainment areas for GHGs, EPA has complied with the Alabama Power holding.
For the second limitation (pollutant), petitioners interpret a provision in §166(a), which requires PSD
standards within two years once a pollutant is subjected to a NAAQS, as being the only avenue to add to
the list of pollutants eligible for PSD regulation. Respondents instead argue that the “subject to
regulation” language in §165 is the true indicator of when BACT guidelines must be created under PSD.13

6

75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 , 17,019
NAM Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 33‐39; Texas Stay Motion 1, supra note 2, at 20‐22; EPA Response to Stay
Motions, supra note 2, at 44‐47; States Response to Stay Motions, supra note 2, at 14‐15.
8
Texas Stay Motion 1, supra note 2, at 22‐24; CRR Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 43‐47; EPA Response to Stay
Motions, supra note 2, at 41‐44.
9
42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4).
10
An area may satisfy a NAAQS either by being in actual compliance with, or if, for outside reasons, it is impossible
to say whether or not it is in compliance with, the NAAQS air quality requirements for any given pollutant.
11
636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
12
42 U.S.C. §7471; see also NAM Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 18‐19; Texas Stay Motion 1, supra note 2, at 26‐27;
EPA Response to Stay Motions, supra note 2, at 50‐53; States Response to Stay Motions, supra note 2, at 17‐19.
13
42 U.S.C. §7476(a); see also NAM Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 15‐17; CRR Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 49‐53;
EPA Response to Stay Motions, supra note 2, at 53‐55; States Response to Stay Motions, supra note 2, at 18‐19.
7
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Petitioners’ reading of these three sections is logical, and particularly on area limitations they may have
the most straightforward analysis. However, EPA’s reading also has merit, and is supported by a 30‐
year‐old agency interpretation. EPA is empowered under Chevron to pick any reasonable interpretation
14
of an ambiguous statutory provision. The fate of petitioners’ challenge here will therefore depend on
how ambiguous the DC Circuit reads the CAA to be in this case.

D. Tailoring Rule
The fourth case (now consolidated with the Timing Rule case; see below) challenges the Tailoring Rule
for directly violating clear and unambiguous requirements in the CAA. The CAA lays out clear numeric
guidelines for when stationary sources must be subject to PSD permitting requirements, requiring that
EPA regulate any emitter of 100 tons per year of any listed pollutant.15 For practical reasons, EPA raised
these thresholds to 75,000 or more tons per year, to avoid being put in the position of regulating minor
carbon emitters. On its face this rule violates the statute’s plain text.16
EPA justifies this statutory deviation under three separate doctrines: that strict adherence to this
inflexible text would lead to “absurd results” by imposing excessive administrative burdens on all parties;
that “administrative necessity” requires this for EPA to regulate GHGs at all; and that EPA can proceed
“one‐step‐at‐a‐time” toward full statutory compliance, and it is choosing to start with larger emitters.
Petitioners challenge all three justifications. First, they argue that EPA could easily avoid any “absurd
results” with a more natural reading of the CAA: namely, EPA cannot distort the CAA and then use this
distortion to overturn direct requirements elsewhere. Next, they argue that EPA’s deviations are too
severe to be administratively justified; and that EPA cannot use the “one‐step” doctrine because it is not
putting itself “on the track to compliance. Finally, they question the foundation (and legitimacy) of the
“administrative necessity” and “one‐step” doctrines. In responding, EPA emphasizes the larger intent of
the CAA as being more important than specific and outdated procedural points.17
This part of petitioners’ challenge is probably their strongest; EPA will not get deference in its attempt to
bypass statutory text, and the doctrinal issues could go either way.

E. Procedural Challenges
Petitioners also raise a number of procedural challenges to EPA’s regulatory process. Most notably, they
accuse EPA of avoiding consideration of certain required factors by shuffling complaints around such
that they are never directly addressed. If EPA did not in fact respond to every complaint then their
rulemaking will be called into question. A court may choose to examine this argument more closely,
although nothing immediately jumps out. Petitioners also accuse the EPA of usurping state sovereignty
14

Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 837.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(1), 7602(j), 7661(2)(B).
16
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,567.
17
NAM Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 28‐32; CRR Stay Motion, supra note 2, at 53‐56; Texas Stay Motion 2, supra
Note 2, at 9‐13; EPA Response to Stay Motions, supra note 2, at 61‐65.
15
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by micromanaging states’ SIP processes and giving insufficient time to come up with independent
solutions. They further accuse EPA of failing to properly consider the rules effects on energy supplies,
minorities, and possible information requests under certain other laws. This paper does not seek to
resolve these additional claims.

F. Synthesis
Undeniably, the CAA is imperfectly tailored to the problem of regulating carbon emissions. However,
EPA’s interpretations of its four rules do stand a reasonable chance of surviving DC Circuit review. As
above, both sides’ specific arguments (and who makes which) are laid out in Appendices A and B.

III.Procedural Overview
Over 80 individual cases have been filed against the four rules listed above, from 35 distinct parties. Just
two of these parties have called for more stringent regulation (those from the Sierra Club and the Center
18
for Biological Diversity). The cases split roughly evenly among challenges to the four major EPA
regulations (listed above), as detailed below.
Seventeen petitioners filed challenges to EPA’s Endangerment Finding by the February 16, 2010
deadline. These cases were consolidated on February 18, under the name Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (CRR v. EPA), and given a docket number of 09‐1322.
Ten more cases were consolidated with this group on November 15 that challenged EPA’s refusal to
reconsider the Endangerment Finding (originally CRR v. EPA, docket 10‐1234), bringing the total to 26
(minus one environmental lawsuit, see below).
Similarly, seventeen (separate) cases have been filed so far challenging EPA’s Tailpipe Rule, and were
consolidated under the case CRR v. EPA on August 20, 2010 and assigned to docket 10‐1092. The 44
remaining suits challenging EPA’s Timing Rule and Tailoring Rule were consolidated into one case on
November 15, 2010, as CRR v. EPA (docket 10‐1073). This consolidation, requested by the EPA,
combined 17 (also separate) suits filed challenging EPA’s Timing Rule (same name); with 25 challenges
to the Tailoring Rule (originally consolidated as Southeastern Legal Foundation v. EPA, docket 10‐1131).
Three challenges to EPA regulations from environmental groups (urging further activity) were removed
from the main group of cases on November 15 and consolidated with Sierra Club v. EPA (docket 09‐1018)
to form a group of five environmental cases. The consideration of this consolidated group has been held
in abeyance pending the results of motions to stay (see below).

18

Much of the information compiled here and below can be accessed from the CCCL Climate Litigation Chart,
available at http://www.climatecasechart.com.

6

However, DC Circuit internal procedural rules hold that even after a case is consolidated, individual
19
litigants still maintain the ability to file separate motions. Petitioners have taken advantage of this
fact. On September 15, 2010, three different coalitions of petitioners filed motions to stay all or part of
EPA’s climate regulations. One such motion was filed by Texas. A second was filed by a coalition of
interest groups led by CRR, SLF, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Landmark Legal Foundation, and
the Ohio Coal Association, and also requests a stay of all EPA action. A group of trade associations led
by the National Association of Manufacturers filed the third motion, but asks only to stay the Timing and
Tailoring rules, and the Endangerment Finding as it could be applied to stationary sources. This group
does not request a stay of the core of the Endangerment Finding or the Tailpipe Rule.
20

Finally, a coalition of businesses, interest groups, and U.S. Representatives have filed a motion for
coordination of related cases, alleging that because the four EPA regulations are so closely related they
should be heard as a group by the same panel. EPA disagrees, and has filed a response to this motion,
21

as has a coalition of 19 states and the City of New York. Other motions, including one request for
expanded page limits, are largely procedural, although they only add to the mass of litigation activity.

IV. Consolidation and Coordination Possibilities
To manage the multitude of lawsuits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
considered consolidation and coordination procedures to combine more than 80 cases into a more
manageable number. Industry‐affiliated groups and individuals generally favor some form of case
combination. On the other hand, environmentalist‐affiliated groups intervening on the EPA’s side
22
(“state intervenors”) and the EPA prefer separate hearings for reasons explained below.

19

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures
23 (Amended May 10, 2010).
20
Chamber of Commerce; Clean Air Implementation Project; Competitive Enterprise Institute; Freedom Works;
Science and Environmental Policy Project; Energy‐Intensive Manufacturers ‟Working Group on Greenhouse Gas
Regulation”; Mark R. Levin and Landmark Legal Foundation; Portland Cement Association; Southeastern Legal
Foundation; The Langdale Company; Georgia Motor Trucking Association, Inc.; Collins Industries, Inc.; Kennesaw
Transportation, Inc.; J&M Tank Lines, Inc.; Southeast Trailer Mart, Inc.; Georgia Agribusiness Council, Inc.;
Langboard, Inc.; and 14 Representatives [Nathan Deal (GA‐5th); John Shadegg (AZ‐3rd) and Dan Burton (IN‐5th);
John Linder (GA‐7th); Dana Rohrabacher (CA‐46th); John Shimkus (IL‐19th); Phil Gingrey (GA‐11th); Lynn
Westmoreland (GA‐3rd); Tom Price (GA‐6th); Paul Broun (GA‐10th); Steve King (IA‐5th); Jack Kingston (GA‐1st);
Michele Bachmann (MN‐6th); Kevin Brady (TX‐8th)].
21
The 19 states in this coalition are: California, Massachusetts, New York, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Pennsylvania.
22
See Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, D.C. Cir. Doc.: 1262772 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/13/document_gw_06.pdf; Respondent’s Opposition to Motion for
Coordination of Cases and Cross‐Motion for Consolidation of Consolidated Case No. 10‐1131 with Consolidated
Case No. 10‐1073, D.C. Cir. Doc.: 1265175 (Sep. 10, 2010), available at http://www.eenews.net/assets/
2010/09/13/document_gw_01.pdf; Response to Petitioners’ Motion to Coordinate Cases by Intervener States, D.C.
Cir. Doc.:1265212 (Sep. 10, 2010), available at http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/13/document_gw_02.pdf.

7

The first, simpler, fix is to consolidate claims, essentially making them one large case. Consolidation is
allowed “[i]n order to achieve the most efficient use of the Court’s resources,” for “all petitions for
23

review of agency orders entered in the same administrative proceeding.” This has already occurred
among the challenges to each individual EPA rule and between the challenges to EPA’s Timing and
Tailoring Rules, as detailed above.
Petitioners have also moved to “coordinate” the four separate cases. Case coordination involves
hearing multiple cases before the same panel, with a goal of yielding complementary decisions in cases
where challenges cover related activities. In their motion for consolidation, petitioners argue that case
24
coordination under a single panel is standard procedure, citing four cases that make this point. The
court ruled on November 15, 2010 that immediate coordination of the cases was not justified, but has
left the door open to effectively coordinate cases after the motions for stay (below) are decided.

A. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners’ main argument is that the cases are substantively interrelated so as to “amount[] to a single
policy approach,” and should be decided by the same panel to avoid “duplicative briefing” and
“conflicting decisions.” The duplication would come from the DC Circuit’s consideration of “core
25

questions of EPA’s legal authority to regulate and record support for that authority.” To support their
contention that the rules are interrelated, petitioners quote EPA itself: “In recent months, EPA has taken
four related actions that, taken together…will subject GHGs emitted from stationary sources to PSD
requirements, and limit[] the applicability of PSD requirements to GHG sources on a phased‐in basis.”

26

Petitioners further argue that combining the cases into one case will prevent EPA from attempting to
dismiss challenges to its rules based on jurisdictional principles (particularly standing, in the injury‐in‐
fact and causation inquiries). They contend that separate review could result in an attempt to call for “a
27
more appropriate forum” in every case, and thereby deny all forums for review.

B. Respondents’ Arguments
EPA and state intervenors disagree, and strongly oppose coordinating these cases with those reviewing
the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule. EPA argues that combining these cases will confuse the
courts with largely irrelevant piles of documents and cause a proliferation of lawsuits, in violation of CAA

23

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures
23 (Amended May 10, 2010).
24
Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, supra note 1, at 14; cases discussed in detail below.
25
Id. at 2, 11, 16.
26
Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of Substantial Inadequacy and SIP Call, Proposed Rule (Aug. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.epa.gov/airquality/nsr/documents/20100810FinalGHGSIPCallProposal.pdf.
27
Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, supra note 1, at 16‐19.

8

28

rules. To support this, it and state intervenors point out that the EPA regulations deal with entirely
29
different administrative records and legal questions, and involve “an entirely separate set of issues.”
Furthermore, EPA argues that separating the cases will not present justiciability issues with respect to
parties, or to individual arguments. It points out that DC Circuit rules allow petitioners to use evidence
30
outside the administrative record to establish standing.

C. Synthesis
Petitioners’ showing that EPA views the regulations as four parts of an interrelated block of regulation
gives strong support to their claim. Beyond that, however, their arguments are incomplete. The
fundamental linking question said to justify coordination (whether EPA has “authority to regulate”) is
31
vague, and the guidelines for the four regulations are in three entirely different sections of the CAA.
Also, standing, as a constitutional justiciability issue, is not beholden to administrative records and looks
to the final results of agency action. Thus, petitioners’ standing case should not be weakened if their
challenges are separated.
Neither EPA nor state intervenors respond to petitioners’ case support. However, an analysis of the four
cases reveals little. In the first cited case, Davis v. DOJ, two petitions were heard and decided by the
same panel on the same day – but they both involved the very narrow question of retroactive
32
application of attorneys’ fees under 2007 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, in
Noramco of Del. v. DEA two petitions were coordinated, but both involved DEA approval of
33

specialized importers under §823(a) of the Controlled Substances Act. For the In re TMI Litigation,
34

the quote relied on in petitioners’ text refers to consolidation (as opposed to coordination) of the
cases at issue, and the issue in common (application of a particular evidentiary rule) was similarly
35
particular.

28

“[J]udicial review for any agency action is to be based ‘exclusively’ on the administrative record for that
particular action.” Id at 11; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(A).
29
For two different arguments laying out the different questions, see Respondent’s Opposition to Motion for
Coordination of Cases, supra note 1, at 12‐14, 16; and Response to Petitioners’ Motion to Coordinate Cases by
Intervener States, supra note 1, at 2‐5.
30
D.C. Cir. R. 15(c)(2), 28(a)(7).
31
The endangerment finding would turn largely on the adequacy of the scientific basis for climate change and rules
established in Title I Part A; the tailpipe rule deals with Title II Federal Emission Standards for Moving Sources, and
the Timing and Tailoring Rules cover Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) concerns in Title I, Part B.
32
Davis v. DOJ, 610 F.3d 750 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Judicial Watch v. BLM, 610 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
33
Noramco of Del. v. DEA, 375 F.3d 1148, 1153, 1155‐57 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
34
The “purpose of similar device under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) is to “avoid duplication of effort” and
“prevent conflicting outcomes” in interconnected cases.” Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, supra note 1,
at 14).
35
This was a nuclear radiation exposure case, where two claims were identical (appealing dismissal of evidence),
and the third was similar (appealing manipulation of evidence fines). In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 622‐629, 724
(3d Cir. 1999).

9

The most similar situation to the claims above comes from the New York v. EPA cases, where the
36

same parties challenged two distinct rules interpreting CAA’s New Source Review (NSR) program. The
court here denied consolidation but granted coordination, similar to what petitioners ask for
here. However, even here both cases involved NSR guidelines, thereby looking substantially more
similar than EPA’s regulations here.
The battle lines on this issue appear to be clear‐cut: petitioners see some advantage from consolidation,
EPA some disadvantage. It is possible that petitioners hope to sully EPA’s Endangerment Finding
defense by linking it directly to other parts of EPA’s regulatory regime that are less legally supportable
(and more politically controversial). However, coordination here will be difficult for petitioners to justify
given prior practice in this area.

V. Motions to Stay Implementation of the Regulations
As the complex of litigation moves forward in the DC Circuit, opponents of EPA regulations have voiced
concerns that rules due to take effect in January 2011 may severely harm their economies before they
have a chance to be overturned in court. To avoid this, three different groups of petitioners moved on
September 15 to stay all or part of EPA’s regulations. As outlined above, two motions, one headed by
the Coalition for Responsible Regulation (CRR) and one filed solely by the State of Texas, seek to stay all
regulations. The third motion, from a coalition headed by the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM), asks only to stay the portion of the rules that would allow GHG regulation of stationary sources
(including manufacturing plants). EPA filed a response on October 28, 2010.

37

In requesting a stay of defendants’ activities, petitioners must show four things: 1) that they are likely to
prevail on the merits of the case; 2) that they will suffer irreparable injury if defendants are allowed to
pursue their activities during litigation; 3) that enforcing this stay will not hurt other interested parties;
38
and 4) that a stay is in the public interest. The DC Circuit has noted that “If the arguments for one
factor are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the arguments in other areas are rather
39
weak.” A preliminary analysis of the merits of these challenges is given above, though it is worth
40
noting that the movants here “by a clear showing, carr[y] the burden of persuasion.”

A. Petitioners’ Arguments

36

One case challenged procedures for calculating emissions, special treatment of certain plants, and
recordkeeping under NSR. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The other challenged the exemption of
certain‐sized projects from NSR Review altogether. New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
37
The briefs analyzed here are the same as those analyzed above. See the list of briefs, supra note 2.
38
Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009); see also Serono Laboratories, Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1318
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (relied upon by NAM et al.).
39
CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C.Cir.1995); see also Serono Laboratories, Inc.
v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Relied on by Texas).
40
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
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Petitioners claim irreparable injury by discussing a wide range of potential harms. NAM points to
business losses from carbon requirements and an expensive permitting process, as well as concerns with
uncertainty for small emitters protected by the Tailoring Rule. CRR echoes these economic concerns,
while Texas focuses more on administrative harms (including the lost right to implement its own
regulatory program, and administrative costs imposed). All three complain that, permits will be
immediately required, they will be impossible to acquire at the outset, which could cause a de facto
moratorium on construction work.
In arguing that a stay will not harm other parties, petitioners argue that a mere delay could not harm
EPA’s regulatory purpose. CRR and NAM particularly point out that because the benefits of permits
were not quantified, there can be no loss of benefits; and Texas says that, “subject to judicial review,”
other states are free to revise their own laws to comply with these regulations. NAM goes on to argue
that there will be no lost “immediate” environmental benefit, and indeed there could be a loss if carbon
“leakage” sends manufacturing to more carbon intensive countries. NAM also emphasizes that the
Tailpipe Rule as applied to vehicles could stay in place, achieving EPA goals.
Finally, petitioners argue that a stay is in the public interest in many ways. CRR argues that it is
necessary to give Congress time to speak on the matter. NAM agrees, and adds its previous points that
enforcement would harm the economy and possibly lead to carbon leakage. Texas, meanwhile,
emphasizes the need for regulatory certainty before beginning actual regulation.

B. Respondents’ Arguments
After responding to the merits of petitioners’ claims, EPA turns first to irreparable injury. Its response is
thorough, and follows six main lines of argument in challenging a finding of irreparable injury:
1. Economic loss, even if real, cannot be considered irreparable harm;
2. The chain of causation leading to economic stagnation is exaggerated, based on faulty
predictions, and speculative (no injunction is available for speculative harms).
3. EPA regulations decrease, rather than increase, regulatory uncertainty by establishing rules;
4. PSD and Title V permit costs are regulatory burdens, which cannot be irreparable harm;
5. Permit availability concerns are mostly false: EPA’s implementation process is eminently
workable and there will be no de facto construction ban. Texas’ implementation concerns thus
would be due to Texas’ own irresponsible actions, so cannot be blamed on the EPA; and
6. Texas has no sovereign right not to regulate GHGs, so there is no federalism concern.
EPA’s responses to the harm to other interested parties and to the public interest are interrelated. EPA
first mentions environmental harms that will result with any delay of implementation, pointing to its
Endangerment Finding and Mass v. EPA to argue that its failure to quantify damages does not mean
there are none. EPA then points out specifically that the Vehicle Rule has been partially implemented
(including in California), and relied upon by the auto industry, and so staying that rule would particularly
harm other parties.
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C. Synthesis
The DC Circuit’s decision will be influenced by how convincing it finds the respective arguments about
the certainty and severity of harms caused by EPA regulations to business and the economy. EPA’s point
that merely economic harms cannot qualify will strengthen its case, but permanent closure of factories
and loss of economic activity, if petitioners are deemed correct in this prediction (by no means certain),
would still be relevant to any decision. EPA’s arguments around permit costs and availability are more
solid. EPA’s structure for issuing permits provides a federal backstop that states may opt into if their
own plans are delayed. States may opt not to use this backstop, but any argument focusing on political
eventualities would seem to violate DC Circuit Rules against preventing speculative damages. EPA’s
arguments look the strongest against a stay of the Vehicle Rule, particularly since one petitioner group
agrees with them. They look the weakest when they minimize the possibility of economic upheaval
these regulations may bring as companies adhere to new BACT standards, though the point about
“purely economic harms” not qualifying as irreparable injury will help.
A decision by the DC Circuit here is likely in late November or December (any stay must be issued before
January 2, 2011 to prevent all agency action).

VI. Looking Forward: Remedy Options for the Court
Assuming the case moves forward, questions remain as to what, exactly, the DC Circuit will do if it rules
in favor of the challengers on the merits of their cases. The two primary options here are: absolute
vacatur (removing all force of law from the regulations), and remand of the case without vacatur
(maintaining the regulations until EPA issues valid replacements).

A. Severability of Rules
The first question to ask is if remedies should apply to all regulations together, or to individual
regulations. Here, the severability of an agency’s set of related actions “depends on the issuing agency’s
41
intent.”
In the present cases, language petitioners have cited showing that EPA considers its
regulations thus far to be “four related actions” may be damaging to the EPA if the court determines
that one of the four rules is unlawful. However, EPA’s regulations likely fall short of being a “single,
regional program” that justified unified treatment of CAIR. Given that some petitioners have asked for
partial stays of EPA action, EPA will have a strong case that its regulations do not amount to a single
program, in a train of argument mirroring that in pending case coordination motions (above).

B. The Rule for Remand vs. Vacatur
Some precedent on these tradeoffs comes from the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which was
successfully challenged in the DC Circuit as North Carolina v. EPA. At issue in that case was an EPA
rulemaking that established a cap and trade system to reduce upwind states’ ability to interfere with air
41

North Carolina v. FERC, 730 F.2d 790, 795‐96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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quality for fine particulate matter in downwind states. The Court ultimately ruled that a cap and trade
system improperly interfered with National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) obligations in
violation of the CAA, but allowed EPA’s program to continue until it issued a replacement42 (EPA just
released a replacement Proposed Transport Rule in July 2010 with the final rule expected spring 2011).43
In North Carolina, the court runs a two‐part test to determine whether to vacate EPA’s rules: “‘the
44

seriousness of the order’s deficiencies . . . and the disruptive consequences of an interim change.’”
For the first, the court has justified a vacatur by saying that very little of overturned EPA regulations
would survive in “anything approaching recognizable form.” In current litigation, the EPA’s rules have
been challenged as being completely invalid (not merely incorrect), which would seem to support a
vacatur if EPA loses on the merits.
However, the first question may not be the determining factor here. Even an unjustifiable regulation
may remain in place depending on consideration of the other prong, which looks at disruptive
consequences; and this prong may be of more use to the EPA. In the North Carolina litigation, the court
initially vacated the ruling with a justification that regulation activity over fine particulate matter would
45
continue through traditional channels. The same panel later overturned this initial determination:
The parties’ persuasive demonstration, extending beyond short‐term health benefits to
impacts on planning by states and industry with respect to interference with the states’
ability to meet deadlines for attaining national ambient air quality standards . . . shows
that the rule has become so intertwined with the regulatory scheme that its vacatur
would sacrifice clear benefits to public health and the environment while EPA fixes the
rule. NC v. EPA, 550 F.3d at 1178‐79.
This describes the requirements to avoid vacatur fairly clearly: EPA will have to show that vacating its
GHG regulations would harm clear benefits to the environment (so it must justify its Endangerment
Finding), in a way that interferes with an existing regulatory scheme (such that disrupting that scheme
would constitute a major setback for regulatory efforts). The court has demonstrated particular concern
with disrupting already‐existing and well established trading markets.

C. Synthesis
Interestingly, this determination may thus be affected by the outcome in the pending motions to stay
enforcement of EPA regulations: if EPA is prevented from regulating during litigation, there will be no
42

Two separate rulings are discussed here. The December 2008 decision, North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176
(D.C. Cir. 2008), overturned the July 2008 vacatur issued in North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
43
Federal Implementation Plans To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg.
45,210 (Aug. 2, 2010).
44
Here, the court quotes Allied‐Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 998 F.2d 146, 150‐51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
45
Notably, the court was comforted that State Implementation Plan (SIP) Calls could continue to be issued in
conjunction with Nonattainment Area (NA) and Prevention of Significant Deterioration(PSD) requirements under
Title I of the CAA. NC v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 930.
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regulatory structure to interrupt, as there was in North Carolina (though delay in carbon regulation
could still justify avoiding a vacatur if EPA regulatory activities are stayed). This prong may also affect
remedies in a partial victory for challengers: the Tailoring Rule has been said to face the strongest legal
challenges, but it also reduces the regulatory burden imposed by the other rules. Realistically, the court
may have to perceive a strong legal challenge to both the Tailoring and Timing rules in order to vacate.
EPA may claim further support from language suggesting that “it is appropriate to remand without
vacatur in particular occasions where the vacatur ‘would at least temporarily defeat . . . the enhanced
protection of the environmental values covered by’ the EPA rule at issue.” This language could be used
to argue against suspending carbon regulations, assuming the Endangerment Finding is supported.
However, petitioners may respond by pointing out that “the threat of disruptive consequences cannot
save a rule when its fundamental flaws ‘foreclose EPA from promulgating the same standards on
46
remand.’”
Scholars generally note that remand without vacatur is normally reserved for procedural flaws and
inadequate explanations: “the D.C. Circuit does not [waive vacatur] where it finds that the agency’s rules
47
violate the statute the agency is administering.” This plain language looks bad for EPA, which is after
all defending its interpretation of the CAA. However, the comparison to North Carolina is particularly
instructive here: both cases will potentially involve misapplication of CAA Rules in evolving regulation
activities, and so the lenience granted to EPA in the first ruling should help EPA’s chances in the second.

VII.

Conclusion

The resolution of this and other similar cases will be important to watch, because EPA’s regulations here
present the strongest source of national GHG mitigation activity in today’s political
climate. Furthermore, successful regulation may also catalyze legislative action: because such
regulations would likely be preempted by Congressional action, regulated entities may see a market
mechanism as superior to the command‐and‐control type of regulation that has characterized EPA’s
efforts thus far.

46

This language comes from the later‐reversed NC v. EPA decision, but quotes a still‐valid ruling from 2007, Natural
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1261‐62 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
47
Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: a New Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency
Rulemaking, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV 278, 283 (2005). Further support for this comes from cases: see EDF v. EPA, 898 F.2d
183 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (remanding an EPA decision for inadequate consideration of factors); Allied‐Signal, Inc. v. U.S.
NRC, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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Appendix A: Summary of Arguments against EPA Regulations
Legal Argument
Endangerment Finding Challenge
EPA unlawfully delegated its judgment to others (IPCC)
The IPCC is an unaccountable body, and does not consider the policy-relevant
risk/harm issues that EPA is obligated to consider
The IPCC has also shown itself to be unreliable in its assessments
Relying on the IPCC keeps relevant facts from the public record
EPA understated uncertainty and ignored alternative explanations
EPA misconstrued endangerment finding by not defining at what level GHGs are
dangerous; that they are a "risk" is not enough
EPA must consider policy choices in determining "endangerment"
EPA invalidly considered GHGs not emitted by vehicles in its finding
Tailpipe Rule Challenge
Any benefits from tailpipe reductions are too trivial to justify regulation because
they are a tiny fraction of global emissions
This rule has no rational basis; it is redundant to NHTSA CAFE Standards
EPA invalidly failed to consider all impacts of the tailpipe rule - particularly its
role in allowing stationary source regulation
Timing/Triggering Rule Challenge
"Subject to regulation" covers pollutants listed when CAA was passed
EPA must issue a NAAQS to institute a PSD program and add to this list
Alabama Power clearly says location must be the basis for PSD; areas must show
attainment of GHG NAAQS to be subject to PSD GHG rules
Linking moving source emissions regulation to stationary source regulation
makes no sense within CAA structure
EPA's interpretation here would lead to absurd results
EPA's interpretation differs from Congress' presumptive intent
Tailoring Rule Challenge
EPA directly violates clear, numerical regulation rules in the CAA
"Absurd results" doctrine cannot be used because a natural reading of the CAA
would more easily avoid such results
"Absurd results" doctrine cannot be used because CAA guidelines are specific
and numeric, not "words of general meaning"
"Administrative necessity" doctrine cannot be used because CAA's standards are
clear and allow no deviation
"Administrative necessity" doctrine is little more than dicta
"One-step-at-a-time doctrine" cannot be used because EPA is not putting itself
"on the track to compliance" - so it does not qualify here
Also, EPA's regulations are industry-changing, not merely procedural
"One-step-at-a-time" doctrine is EPA-created and not valid
EPA usurps state sovereignty, violating EPA-state partnership rules
EPA's new state requirements followed improper procedure by requiring
reinterpritation of SIPs instead of new issued SIPs
Even if proper, states are entitled to more implementation time
General Challenges
EPA ducked oversight by bouncing comments between rules and not considering
any directly; these actions were arbitrary and capricious
EPA failed to consider effects on minorities, energy supply, information requests,
and the economy as required by various laws
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Appendix B: Summary of Responses in Support of EPA Regulations
Legal Argument

EPA

Endangerment Finding Response
EPA did not delegate its judgment: it vetted reports in Notice and Comment
The IPCC is reliable and uses stringent peer review: weak isolated attacks on alleged
misconduct do not undermine its conclusions
The IPCC is well respected even by the IAC (cited by petitioners)
EPA need not reprint reports in the public record; it is impractical
EPA also relied on USGCRP/NRC, whose validity is not at issue
EPA did evaluate uncertainties and consider other explanations
Finding Endangerment does not require quantitative data; a rational discretionary
judgment that there is risk is sufficient
Regardless, EPA did define endangerment thresholds
Finding endangerment does not require consideration of policy implications
Petitioners' demands here contradict the mandate in Mass v. EPA
All six gases act together, so were considered together; the endangerment finding need
not be limited to the four GHGs emitted by vehicles
Tailpipe Rule Response
CAA requires EPA to regulate sources that contribute at all to endangerment
Regardless, vehicle emissions are non-trivial contributors to climate change
Mass v. EPA directly says that NHTSA regulation cannot replace CAA action
Further, the CAA allows more targeted, effective EPA regulation
EPA need not consider the Tailpipe Rule's role in enabling other regulations
Considering costs/benefits of derivative rules is disfavored, and impractical
Timing/Triggering Rule Response
A pollutant can be subject to regulation for PSD even without a NAAQS: CAA §7476
requires a PSD finding after a NAAQS, but not only after a NAAQS
Area is the basis for applying PSD; but being in attainment for any pollutant (not just
GHGs) will subject an area to PSD regulations: see Alabama Power
PSD regulations and permits must consider all CAA-regulated pollutants
Title V permits are a separate issue, and must be issued even without PSD because
other greenhouse gas regulations will still apply to major sources
As Mass v. EPA notes, Congress wanted CAA to be flexible for new threats
These PSD policies have been in place for years; review is no longer available
Tailoring Rule Response
"Absurd Results" doctrine values intent and larger purpose over specific text
A natural reading of the CAA support's EPA's conclusion. EPA hews closely to the text
while preserving Congress' intent to regulate dangerous pollutants
"Administrative necessity" doctrine values substantive over regulatory laws
CAA requires GHG regulation, so EPA can justify regulatory deviations here
"One-step-at-a-time doctrine" is usable: EPA's Four-step regulatory process notes, and
some petitioners agree, that EPA will cover all sources eventually
The tailoring rule is critical to the viability of EPA's other regulations. Petitioners
confirm this fact when challenging the other three rules
Note: no response to allegations that EPA improperly mandated state actions - these
issues were primarily addressed in the "irreparable harm" discussion
General Responses
EPA's interpretive regulations are non-discretionary; economic, other effects must be
considered when issuing individual rules (particular BACTs, etc.).
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